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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to inquire into the possible significance of materials in the production of 
emerging strategic outcomes. The article first sets out to discuss the different ways contemporary 
strategy research define the identity of strategic actors. It is argued that the various schools of 
strategy research, although different in important respects, operate with a common human 
centered assumption: Humanity is treated as given – the strategic actor or subject is assumed to 
be an individual human or a collective of humans. 
By adding the possible significance of materials and other non-human entities to the explanatory 
repertoire of strategy research, another line of inquiry is pursued. The performative perspective 
thus proposed, is inspired by the classical work of Von Clausewitz and the recent anthropology 
of science, technology and organizational identities. In the proposed perspective, the human 
centered assumption is no longer just a premise for doing strategy research, but instead 
considered an interesting emerging outcome to be explained. Further more, the performative 
perspective allows strategy research to extend the notion of emergent strategies so as to include 
the possible significance of materials and other non-human entities in the explanation of 
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emerging strategic identities and outcomes. Hence, also a new task has been added to strategy 
research:  To explain how emerging strategic identities – consisting of both humans and non-
humans, are produced as part of strategic outcomes.  
Three cases are presented, each of them with a particular bearing on how materials participate in 
the making of emerging strategic identities and outcomes: 
The first case account for strategies transforming plans into anti-plans. This is a case of how a 
strategic plan is betrayed (or rejected) by an emerging collective consisting of both humans and 
diverse materials like a paper inscription and heavy machinery.  
The second case account for how the emerging twin identities of the strategic management 
subject and the human object are co-produced in interaction with a machine delegate. 
Finally, the third case account for how the strategic technology and the strategic collective 
emerge and co-produce each other as a macro-actor, only to become transformed in unexpected 
ways - as common technology and reflective human subjects.  
 
In the concluding section, it is argued that the humanity of the reflective human subject should 
be regarded as an emerging identity, co-produced in interaction with diverse materials like 
machinery. It is further argued that strategy research has slowly written out Von Clausewitz 
original insight in this respect. The complexity Von Clausewitz introduced with the notion of 
‘degrees of humanity’ has been replaced with a given humanity, yet the costs of doing so remain 
outside the frames of contemporary strategy research. Failing to attend to the possible 
significance of materials in producing degrees of humanity has made strategy research as much 
producers of strategic outcomes, as providers of explanations and observations. The expression 
‘technological strategy as macro-actor’ summarizes these findings and the associated 
implications for research and practice. 
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1. RE-SEARCHING AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF STRATEGY 
 
The origins of strategy seem multiple and intertwined. Tracing its history will lead us to 
organizational entities and events such as the modern corporation, the social scientists writing 
about strategy, as well as to the conduct of war. As described by Evered (1980) and recalled by 
Quinn et al (1988), this intertwined history of strategy can at least be traced back to Alexander’s 
time. Every contemporary strategy researcher is familiar with that history, yet – or so it will be 
argued – one of its most important lessons seems largely forgotten. Some how strategy research 
made a radical break from its own history, by directing its attention away from the possible 
significance of materials in the production of strategy. This radical break seems to coincide with 
strategy research becoming a modern institutionalized domain of the social sciences. However, 
at the moment of becoming modern, it carried other names and titles, such as ‘On War’ (Von 
Clausewitz, 1832/1988).  
The author and General from the battlefields in Europe paid close attention to the possible 
significance of materials:  
 “ If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to 
war, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees of feelings of 
humanity, until some one steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body”.  
( Von Clausewitz, 1832/1988, p.345). 
 
Von Clausewitz seems to argue that war is not made from humans alone. The body politic of war 
is produced and reproduced in the interaction among humans and artifacts such as more or less 
sharp swords. The author also seems to pragmatically question those that make a distinction 
between humanity and the technologies of war while feeling that the former becomes more 
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human as the latter becomes blunter. Such a distinction between humanity and technology can be 
associated with costs and complexifications: When humanity transform in the course of events – 
when the arm is looped ‘from our body’ - bloody mess and dirty hands became part of it. To Von 
Clausewitz, humanity can be produced in degrees – and there seems to be a significant difference 
between a humanity that includes and one that excludes the significance of technology into its 
definition. In my reading, Von Clausewitz has articulated an interesting and original definition of 
humanity that includes the significance of technology – while paying some more attention to the 
costs and complexifications arising from a failure to do so. Pure humanity – an entity separated 
and protected from technology, contains its own ironic paradox. Through practice, it seems to 
transform into a bloody mess. Indeed, the work of Von Clausewitz can be read as an argument 
against such purifications, be it in relation to ‘humanity’ or ‘strategy’ – the twin main topics of 
this article. 
 
1.1 Humanity as given– in contemporary strategy research 
Contemporary strategy research pays tribute to Von Clausewitz (e.g. Quinn et al. 1988, 
Mintzberg et al. 1998). But is the possible significance of various materials of technology 
included in the way strategy research is addressing its central topic? To begin with, it is one of 
the early merits of modern strategy research to put technology on the research agenda. Ansoff & 
Stewart (1967), were among the first: 
 
Technology is here to stay. Managing it well takes no more effort than managing it poorly, 
and the results are a great deal more profitable. The best way to be sure of achieving such 
results, we suggest, is to formulate a technological strategy that is based on a systematic 
analysis…( p. 83). 
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 Technology is seen by them as something to be planned and managed with the help of rational 
cognitive schemes, that is, the ‘technological strategy’. This concern with an abstract and 
dematerialized cognition, i.e. planning, analysis and the development of procedural rationality, 
has turned out to be one of the more persistent themes in strategy research. In the words of 
Pappas (1984/1988, p. 235): “...technology can be planned and managed using formal 
techniques... “. To take another example, Rieck & Dickson (1993, p.398), seek to develop a 
“…utilitarian model of the process of technology strategy…using a problem-solving technique 
more generally associated with engineering design, which provides a convergent and coherent 
pathway to possible solutions”. More recently, Chiesa & Mazini (1998) try to reformulate what 
they appropriately label the ‘traditional approach’ to technology strategy but the only change is 
an attempt to integrate the dynamics of technology in a general framework for corporate 
technology planning.  
The reader does not see so much of the materials of ‘technology strategy’ in these accounts. 
There is little interaction between humans and the various materials of ‘technology strategy’. 
There is little left of the emphasis Von Clausewitz puts on the messy business of producing 
strategy and more emphasis on analytic frameworks for strategic planning. It should perhaps be 
noted that Von Clausewitz too recognized planning as part of strategy. But as the writings 
unfold, On War seems to reverse the simplifying approach in which strategy is either defined as 
a plan or defined as something that follows a plan conceived of elsewhere. A more complex 
anthropological approach to strategy emerge – strategy should travel with the field – not be kept 
pure and protected from it: 
“Strategy must go with the army to the field in order to arrange particulars on the spot, and to 
make the modifications in the general plan which incessantly become necessary in War. 
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Strategy can therefore never take its hand from the work for a moment. That this, however, 
has not always been the view taken is evident from the former custom of keeping Strategy in 
the cabinet and not with the Army…”(Ibid.p.241).  
 
When strategy is separated from the field and kept safely in the cabinet, there is little left of the 
messy work of strategy emphasized by Von Clausewitz. In its place, the author seems to argue, a 
new purified entity emerge - strategy as a plan separated from politics. Von Clausewitz questioned 
such purifications, notably for their less recognized political implications. Less than four years prior 
to his death, the General is asked to comment upon a strategic plan made by the Prussian General 
Staff:   
 
“War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means. 
Consequently, the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in nature, and 
their political character increases the more the plan applies to the entire campaign and to the 
whole state…According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military 
evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.” [My 
emphasis]1.  
 
When reading On War, contemporary representatives of strategy research have opted for the 
purifying approach. The custom of keeping strategy in the cabinet continues, albeit from a desk in 
the library. One genre of strategy research - commonly known as the ‘planning school’, is perhaps 
                                                          
1 Von Clausewitz  in written letter to C.v. Roeder, 22 Decmber 1827, in Zwei Briefe des Generales Von Clausewitz, 
special issue of the Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 2 (March 1937), p. 6. Quoted from On War, First Princeton 
paperback printing, 1989, Introductory essay by Peter Paret ‘The Genesis of  War, p.7. Princetoon: Princeton University 
(1976/1989). 
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most closely associated with that custom. The following standard assumptions seems to be 
reproduced in this research: 
-The dematerialized cognitive assumption that strategy is primarily a domain restricted to rule 
based cognition, such as formal planning and reason. 
-The managerial assumption that strategy is primarily a domain restricted to formal higher-level 
positions. 
-The human-centered assumption that strategy is primarily a domain restricted to humans - their 
cognitions, plans, intentions, rules, actions etc. 
 
As suggested above, there are other ways of reading Von Clausewitz than the one favored by the 
‘planning school’. There are also other perspectives on strategy that claim to have made the 
study of strategy in practice their central concern. Pavitt (1990), a keen observer in the field for 
several decades, summarize the status in an article with the suggestive title “What we know about 
the strategic management of technology. He says: ”... some of the conventional wisdom from 
business schools and management consultants about technology strategy is irrelevant and even 
misleading. (p. 24). The author finds the planning school to be of little interest (which is no 
regret), and gives due credits to the ‘process school’2 (p.21) for emphasizing the politics of 
strategy formation. In one of the more influential textbooks on the subject, titled “The Strategy 
Process” (Quinn et al, 1988) the fairly central notion of ´emergent strategies´ (Mintzberg, p.15, 
in Quinn et al 1988) is contrasted to the standard assumption that strategy is just a plan, 
expressing human intention. Instead, the notion of emergent strategy emphasizes the significance 
                                                          
2 Pavitt is referring to Pettigrew’s (1987) interesting discussion of strategy research. The field of strategy research is  
no different from other fields in that there are several ways of describing it, all of which are emphasizing some 
distinctions and differences while downplaying others. The present discussion is no exception – hopefully one or two 
fresh distinctions will emerge. For some other interesting discussions and overviews, see Melin 1987, Quinn, Mintzberg 
& James 1988, Zan 1990, Knights and Morgan 1991, Pettigrew 1992, Bengtsson 1993, Whittington 1993, Mintzberg, 
Ahlstrand & Lampel 1998, Sveningsson 1999, Nygaard et al. 2000, Pettigrew et al. (2002). 
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of human action. Strategies are as much produced outcomes in the absence of intentions or 
despite them: “…strategies may result from human actions, but not human designs…[that is] 
emergent strategies, where patterns develop in the absence of intentions, or despite them, which 
went unrealized.” (Ibid., p.15, Mintzberg’s own emphasis3). Pettigrew (1992) puts a similar 
emphasis on humans and their actions in the production of emergent strategies. “ The most 
important [‘ontological assumptions’] for scholars of strategy process are that…The social 
process is constructed, created by human agents – individual or collective-through their 
actions…a process of structural emergence via action” (Ibid., p.8).  
 
In the remaining part of this paper, I will argue for an extended notion of emergent strategies that 
includes humans and the possible significance of materials of technology in the explanation of 
emerging strategic identities and outcomes. However, in order to qualify this line of 
argumentation, it necessary to first take this detour into contemporary strategy research to a 
provisionally conclusion by considering some recent contributions:  
 
Not unlike Pettigrew (1992) above, Clarke (1992) proposes a social constructivist perspective 
and then extends it to the world of technology. This allows the author to address the question of 
stability and change in a new refreshing way. The notion of maturity or equilibrium associated 
with industrial economics, and present in Porter’s (1985) writings on strategic positions, can now 
be questioned “ Maturity is a condition of the mind, not of the technological design configuration 
of the firm” (p.40), the author argues. In line with social constructivism, Clarke puts an emphasis 
on human agency by shifting the focus away from the possible significance of the artifacts of 
technology: “The design configuration concept shifts the focus away from technology as artifacts 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
3 On ‘emergent strategies’, see also Mintzberg 1974 and Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel 1998. 
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to encompass the skill context which supports the technology.” (p.38). The ‘skill context’ is 
another word for the world of humans, including their beliefs, interests, decision-making, and 
skills. The ‘skill context’ is now allowed to influence the content of the technology. The notion 
of skill context no doubt adds important nuances to the black-box conception of the firm 
associated with (industrial) economics and the strategy as plan perspective. Yet there may also 
be costs associated with such an exclusive focus on humans and their skill context. Most 
importantly, it must become increasingly difficult to pay attention to the possibility that skills or 
the ‘skill context’ it self can be re-contextualized and co-produced in interaction with the 
materials of technology. I will return to this point in the concluding section of the paper. 
 
With Clarke et al (1995), the social constructivist approach proposed a few years earlier is 
replaced with another, far more familiar approach: “ While the ‘strategy as plan’ may be a 
simplistic approach to technology, it at least has the merit of ensuring that many of the issues 
discussed here are placed on the managerial agenda.” (p.188). The authors do not explain why 
they conclude that simplicity is the way to ensure managerial attention and relevance. At least 
the empirical work reported by the authors suggests otherwise: “Several managers argued that 
explicitness in planning in this way was not possible or desirable.” (p.176). The mangers 
interviewed seem to be closer to Von Clausewitz than the authors in recognizing the possible 
complexifications involved in simplifications. 
Other researchers have articulated what they label ‘critical perspectives on technology 
management’ (Green, Jones and Coombs, 1996). Not unlike Pavitt (1990) above, a criticism is 
directed towards a neglect of the politics of strategy. In their own words “Much of the literature 
on strategic technology management ignores the voluminous evidence that strategy formulation 
inside firms is a political process…” (Ibid., p.4). The authors are referring approvingly to 
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Mintzberg’s work on emergent strategies as well as Knights and Morgans’ (1991) critical 
discourse analysis. There is very little attention to the materials of technology in this work 
though. Knights and Morgan (1991) have entirely other aims, notably to provide a critique of 
what they identify as the rationalist- and the process view of strategy. But more importantly to 
the present discussion, they also share concerns with the present author regarding humanity, 
notably the human condition for more or less free speech. This concern is also what makes their 
work both interesting and original, albeit with its own unresolved tension regarding the 
constitution of the free speaking critical discourse they seek to establish: The authors view 
strategy as discursive practices “which transform managers and employees alike into subjects 
who secure their sense of purpose and rationality by formulating, evaluating and conducting 
strategy“ (Knights and Morgan 1991, p.252). The authors secure for them selves most of the 
roles and responsibilities for defining strategy:  
To begin with, there are the authors them selves, defining strategy as discursive practices. Then 
the authors set the discursive plot in motion by an act of delegation to other humans such as 
managers and employees. These other humans are so reasonable as to agree to carry out the plot 
by acting in a responsible way according to the rules of delegation handed to them. They produce 
and reproduce the strategic discourse – so as to become the subjects, as defined by the authors. 
Knights and Morgan believe that their discourse analysis effects a more ‘radical break’ with the 
rationalist view of strategy than ‘processual theorists’ like Mintzberg and Pettigrew can provide 
(Ibid. pp.266-7. My emphasis). There are different traces of this ‘radical break’. One of the more 
explicit ones are “…where we differ [from the ‘processual perspective’] is in holding distinct 
epistemological perspectives…the full logic of an hermeneutic epistemology…Our view 
acknowledges that managerial action is influenced by the structure of extrinsic rewards and 
sanctions, but that individual’s preoccupation with identity frequently generates a subjectivity of 
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internal self-discipline” (Ibid. p.267). Less explicit traces of the ‘radical break’ are conveyed to 
the reader in the form of a ‘colonizing’ (Ibid. p.258) strategic discourse. The authors do not 
provide any case studies to substantiate these claims regarding discursive strategy’s capacity to 
‘colonize’, to produce and reproduce internalized forms of individual control and self-discipline 
among the other humans.  
The plot could have ended here - after having defined the other humans as caught up in the 
reproduction of ‘colonizing’ and ‘self-disciplining’ discourse of strategy. The plot would then 
leave these other humans to their own identity making – denying them any access to the 
resources, which allows critical strategy researchers to talk about a ‘radical break’. How then, 
can these other humans transform their identities to become the self-conscious critical free 
speaking subjects that will allow them to make the ‘radical break’? “In conclusion, we believe 
that our approach departs from this prevailing literature and offers the possibility for it to move 
in a more self-consciously critical direction.” (Ibid. p.271). This, then, is the ‘radical break’ and 
the promise the authors offers – the drawing of new boundaries and limitations for the expansion 
of the strategic discourse by adding critical humans equipped with discourse analysis.  
 
Although it remains uncertain whether there are any boundaries and limits to the strategic 
discourse, Von Clausewitz’ suggestion to stay close to the field and the materials of strategy 
seems not to be part of it. Here, there is something that amounts to a radical break. Perhaps 
Knights and Morgan have viewed Von Clausewitz as part of the commonsense discourse they 
seek to break away from. Neglecting the materials - by only equipping the humans with a critical 
discourse, strategy research may participate in producing the kinds of complexifications first 
suggested by Von Clausewitz. This possible ‘critical paradox’ deserves further examination. 
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Pavitt (1990) argued quite forcefully that something was lacking in strategy and management 
research when the topic of technology was on the agenda. A decade later, in a co-edited and 
quite impressive book titled ‘Handbook of strategy and management’ (Pettigrew et al. 2002), 
Pavitt and Steinmueller (2002) have little to add when once again summarizing strategy and 
management research on the topic. However, in this same volume that Pavitt published some of 
his last keen observations, there are interesting suggestions pointing towards an enriched notion 
of strategy. Beginning with Pavitt and Steinmueller (2002) in their opening paragraph, they 
remind strategy research of an important observation, that science and technology seems to be an 
integral part of ‘all recorded civilizations’ (p.344). The authors thus seem to argue that such 
collective achievements like civilization would be difficult to comprehend and explain, without 
paying some more attention to science and technology. The authors also refer approvingly to the 
work done by sociologists of science (Callon 1993) for stressing these issues, notably the 
relational and networked character of such collective entities like firms and their scientific and 
technological capabilities. From the title “Technology in corporate strategy”, the reader can also 
easily infer that the authors see technology as an integral part of strategy, not as an entity or a 
thing to be separated from it. This is an important suggestion in so far as strategy research until a 
quite recent past seems to have become trapped by its own disciplinary distinction between 
‘technology strategy’ and ‘strategy’. At least since the work of Ansoff and Stewart (1967), this 
distinction has served to separate technology from ‘strategy’ in any serious discussion of what 
defines the latter. Instead, technology has been relegated into some sub-discipline within strategy 
research. Here, my aim to a large extent coincides with Pavitt and Steinmuellers’ (2002) 
concerns above - to argue for a notion of ‘strategy’ that includes technology and associated 
materials into its definition.  
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There are also several other contributions in the Handbook pointing towards the redefinition of 
disciplinary boundaries For example, Garud and Van de Ven (2002), and Grant (2002) seem to 
hold the view that the distinction between ‘strategic change’ and ‘organizational change’ should 
not be taken too seriously4. Grant (2002) finds that the resource-based theory of the firm, as well 
as strategic research in general, still operates in a ‘terra incognito’ (p.92) when it comes to grasp 
the organizational dimensions of how firms competencies and capabilities change and develops – 
“we need to know what firms are” (Ibid.) Grant argues. Such trespassing of disciplinary 
boundaries and distinctions sounds promising. For one thing, it should become easier to argue 
for the present line of inquiry in which technology and associated materials are allowed to make 
a difference in defining strategy. Adding to that a relaxed distinction between ‘strategy’ and 
‘organization’, should also make it easier to explore in richer detail the issues and concerns 
raised by several of the authors and contributions in the Handbook referred to above, e.g., the 
organizational dimensions of strategy, including also the changing competencies and capabilities 
of firms.  More specifically, Tsoukas and Knudsens (2002) ask this interesting question “who set 
strategy?” and argue for a process-oriented view of strategy, emphasizing how the process 
produces outcomes.  “…strategy research will become more relevant, encompassing, and subtle 
if it moves towards a process-oriented view of the firm and lets itself open to a constructivist 
view of strategy making” (p. 413) they further argue. Taking up their challenge some years ago 
(Tryggestad 1995), the present work will continue to pursue a constructivist perspective, yet one 
that may allow for slightly different answers to what is basically an important question of 
identity and agency in strategy research, i.e. who or what makes strategy and strategic change?  
The ‘who’ and ‘how’ of strategy making seems also closely associated with the recent ‘practice’ 
turn in strategy research. Still, according to Whittington (2002) in a practice perspective, there 
                                                          
4 A similar example would be the newly established journal with the suggestive title ‘Strategic Organization’, including 
Whittington’s (2003) editorial essay.  
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are at least two distinctive differences compared to a process perspective; a respect for the 
modest (or simple) accomplishments of continuity as opposed to an emphasis on radical change, 
and an emphasis on the micro-level of human practitioners as opposed to an organizational level 
of analysis: “Processes tend to be properties of organizations; practice connects more directly to 
the practitioners…The focus of practice is typically micro-level, interested in the skills and 
performance of people before those of the organization. It is first of all their [peoples’] practices 
that make up processes” (Ibid. pp.128-129). 
 
Strategy making, on this central topic, the Handbook offers few new suggestions. It is still 
individual humans or collectives of humans that make strategy, the important questions being 
who the humans are, and how they are doing it. The materials of technology are still not allowed 
to make a difference. Here, Von Clausewitz’ original suggestions regarding the role of materials 
seems to have been slowly written out of strategy research5. Unfortunately, this seems also to 
include the important connection he made to degrees of humanity. Instead of continuing the 
discussion of humanity opened up by Von Clausewitz, the Handbook of strategy and 
management seems to have reached the conclusion. Humanity is brought safely back into 
strategy research, the reader is ensured. It is certainly true that the process view of strategy, so 
closely associated with Mintzberg’s early work, added an enriched notion of human agency in 
strategy research – the point of reference being procedural rationality, economics, and associated 
notions such as homo economicus. But are there no longer any unresolved questions regarding 
human agency and humanity in strategy research?  
The human centered assumption remains basically unquestioned in strategy research. This given 
humanity, in which the identity of the strategic actor or subject is assumed to be an individual 
                                                          
5Although acknowledging its many merits, the Handbook of strategy and management seems to have missed out Von 
Clausewitz all together. 
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human or a collective of humans – is what the present work will attend to.  By so doing, it should 
be possible to make a constructive contribution to strategy research, perhaps also in approaching 
the more modest and promising place envisaged by Whittington, Pettigrew and Thomas (2002). 
The authors speak of such a modest place as ‘after modernism’. They also emphasize that such a 
modest place is different from ‘post modernism’, which is no regret at all. Of equal importance 
though, is that agreement can be reached regarding this implicit modern distinction between 
humanity and the materials and artifacts of technology, or what I have referred to as the human 
centered assumption. This modern distinction, it will be argued further on, does not resonates so 
well with such modest aspirations for strategy research. 
 
1.2 Humanity produced  – suggesting a performative perspective on strategy 
Can a present day research agenda inspired by Von Clausewitz in any way add something to 
contemporary strategy research? A research agenda inspired by Von Clausewitz would reconnect 
to past concerns. The suggested complexification of the relation between materials and variable 
degrees of humanity should be investigated further. Following Von Clausewitz’ suggestions to 
do anthropology of strategy would also produce a set of concerns shared by contemporary 
strategy research, such as plans, processes, practices and discourses – including their possible 
transformative character. Yet, such a research agenda would focus the investigation on the 
possible significance of the materials - all along. Last but not least, doing anthropology of 
strategy will allow strategy research to connect the concerns with the materials to contemporary 
research on the anthropology of science, technology and organizational identities. This last 
connection, facilitated by the return to Von Clausewitz, will be elaborated below. 
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The notion of performative definitions (Latour 1986, Czarniawska-Joerges 1991) has been 
introduced in order to point out that - through practice, the actors in the field are constantly 
defining and re-defining the world for themselves and for each other. When conducting research 
in a performative perspective, the task is no longer to explain strategy with reference to some 
preconceived context such as ‘turbulent environment’, ‘external forces’, ‘the market structure’, 
‘the firm structure’, or ‘the technology trajectory’. Such procedures are characteristic of an 
attempt to arrive at an ostensive (or essentialist) definition, that is, a definition that could be 
demonstrated once and for all6. Instead of doing more ostensive research, the researcher is 
encouraged to keep the question of strategy open for inclusion of actors’ changing definitions as 
the events emerges and unfolds.  
 
So far, the performative perspective, and the process- and practice perspectives seem to speak 
with rather similar voices. But there are important differences, notably when the question of the 
identity of the actor is considered in some more detail. Callon and Latour (1981) came up with 
this intriguing suggestion to consider actors as networks made up of diverse materials, i.e., 
associations consisting of both human and non-human entities. “Although in order to stabilize 
society everyone – monkey as well as men – need to bring into play associations that last longer 
than the interactions that formed them, the strategies and resources may vary between societies 
of baboons or of men (p.283. Authors’ own emphasis). The emerging difference then – 
producing a performative distinction between baboon society, and that of human society, is that 
                                                          
6 Just to take a few relevant examples from ostensive research: As Grant (2002) has already pointed out, several decades 
of strategic research in more than hundred studies into diversification along such lines have failed to establish these 
kinds of enduring links, e.g. between diversification and profitability, nor been able to come up with any conclusive 
results regarding the question of whether related diversification outperforms unrelated diversification. Whittington 
(2002) makes a similar case regarding corporate-, or more generally, organizational structure. Perrow(1986), one of the 
most prominent researchers associated with contingency theory or the 'technological school' concluded after a few 
decades of research: "There are many problems…The foremost has been the measurement (and thus the definition) of 
technology  it self" (p.143). 
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the latter seems to associate more of these long lasting entities, in effect creating a more 
extended network of associations.  
In strategy research, the corporation, the firm and associated collective bodies of coordinated 
action, has for long been a topic of central importance7. This makes strategy research to share 
with Von Clausewitz a mutual topic, i.e., the body politic of the collective. With Callon and 
Latours’ (1981) notion of a ‘macro-actor’, the very making of the body politic of coordinated, or 
stabilized action has come to the fore. In their own words: “…how does a micro-actor become a 
macro-actor. How can men act ‘like one man’?” (Ibid. p.279. My emphasis). Hence, in order to 
explain such an outcome, in which the identity of the corporate body made to exist, it is first 
necessary to ask this important question of how these kinds of extended and highly aligned 
networks are constructed and brought into existence. This is a question that is too often missed 
out in strategy research, although it is recognized here – indeed even emphasized, that Porter and 
many other eminent strategy researchers has described and defined the outcome, i.e., the macro-
actor it self, in quite precise terms.  
 
Callon and Latour (1981) urges us to pay some more attention to the possible significance of 
durable materials and technologies like machines, written documents and the like in constructing 
the tightly aligned corporate body of the macro-actor. Their work also offers to strategy research 
an entirely different way of describing and explaining the emergence of a strategic actor. For 
example, it becomes possible to make a fairly precise and empirically informed description of 
the difference between a strategic actor (or macro-actor) and the more mundane micro-actor. The 
difference between the two becomes one of degrees – the difference being not an essential (or 
                                                          
7 For example, Porter (1996/2002) rightly points outs that strategy research since long has emphasized that strategy is 
about creating fit. In Porter’s own vivid renderings“ Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its 
strongest link” (p.21, author’s own emphasis).  Strategy is about the creation of “tightly linked activities” (p.24) and 
further on that  " Strategy is creating fit among a company's activities …integrating among them." (p.25).  
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ontological) one, but one of relative size of the networks making up the two actors and their 
identities. Once again, there are no fundamental ontological difference between the two, only the 
“ variations in relative solidity and durability of different sorts of materials.” (p. 284, authors’ 
own emphasis). Such are the heterogeneous materials and associations making up the social, the 
organization, and indeed strategy, the authors argue. An actor then, is made from the same 
substance as the network (or association) that defines it – the identity of the actor being defined 
at any given time through the associations making up of the network. Their work makes visible 
the process of constructing differences in relative size between the associations, and also 
explains why Callon and Latour(1981) ends up questioning ontological distinctions between 
micro- and macro in social theory. ‘Micro’ and ‘macro’ are made of the same substances, the 
author argues. Instead of maintaining such distinctions a priori, the authors argues that the 
distinction between micro and macro can be both (re)produced as well as undermined through 
practice, that is, the performative definitions. In their work, Callon and Latour investigate both 
the construction and de-construction of macro-actors – their relative size and transformation 
being a question of empirical investigation. Such transformations, extensions and interruptions of 
networks, they summarize in the more general notion of translation: “Whenever an actor speaks 
of ‘us’, s/he is translating other actors into a single will, of which s/he becomes spirit and 
spokesman. S/he begins to act for several, no longer for one alone. S/he becomes stronger. S/he 
grows.” (p.279). 
 
Secondly, and closely related to the above, technology is no longer simply a means to an end, 
nor is it to be treated as separated from the social, or the corporate body. Instead, and in a way 
akin to Von Clausewitz’ famous saying, technology can also transforms ends and become 
politics by different means, i.e., as an integral part of what the social or the body politic it self, is 
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made of. It becomes a question of empirical investigation to say something more precise 
regarding such possible heterogeneous roles of the materials and artifacts of technology, or the 
‘object’. Hence, technology may also perform the role as actor and ‘subject’ participating in 
making up the body politic of the social (on this last point, see also Callon and Latour 1992, 
Akrich 1992). Thus, there are no assumptions about a given distribution of identities among 
human and non-human entities like machines and other materials of technology. 
 
There are some further connections between the work of Callon and Latour (1981) and Von 
Clausewitz that should be considered as relevant to strategy research: In their theoretical and 
empirical work (the case of ‘Electricity of France and Renault’), the authors are also inspired by 
a war metaphor. The transformation from a micro-actor to a macro-actor involves a process of 
‘mobilization’, in which human and non-human entities are ‘enlisted’: “ A difference in relative 
size is obtained when a micro-actor can, in addition to enlisting bodies, also enlist the greatest 
number of durable materials…We must now… examine with the same method the strategies 
which enlist bodies, materials, discourses, techniques, feelings, laws, organizations.” (Ibid., 
p.288. My emphasis).  
 
The authors, of course, recognize that the very notion of strategy can be traced back to the 
conduct of war and the practice it entails. Instead of slowly forgetting this important link, Callon 
and Latour (1981) draw upon the rich metaphor of war to say something interesting about what 
emerging strategies and corporate bodies are made of –as well as how to investigate these issues 
that are of such central importance to strategy research: 
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The authors urge us strategy researchers to reconstruct the chain of related events transforming 
micro-actors into macro-actors (and vice versa), by inquiring into the various strategies that 
transforms, extends or interrupt the network. As we have already seen, Von Clausewitz argued 
forcefully for an anthropology of strategy. In a similar vein, Latour’s (1987) methodological rule  
‘follow the actors’, summarize what it takes to produce these kinds of case accounts. The ‘actor’, 
or chain of association, to follow must once again be kept open for further empirical 
investigation. Instead of assuming a fixed distribution of roles and responsibilities between 
humans and non-humans, e.g. that it is humans, individually or collectively, that manages 
strategic technologies, such a given humanity should be recontextualized so as to become a 
question for empirical investigation: Who is managing whom? Is it necessarily so that humans 
are managing technologies? Who is acting and can claim the role as a strategic actor and subject? 
Can the distribution of roles and responsibilities between humans and non-humans transform and 
become variable as events unfold? These are important questions in a performative perspective 
on strategy. Latour’s (1991) case on a mundane hotel management issue - how to get customers 
to bring back their hotel key, is instructive. By adding a heavy weight to the hotel key and the 
spoken statement ‘please bring back the key!’ formerly undisciplined hotel customers transforms 
into more disciplined ones. The extended association – consisting of both humans (a hotel 
manager) and non-humans (the heavy weight now being attached to the hotel key) is necessary to 
bring into the explanation of power and domination, the author argues. It is not sufficient to 
account for the humans among them selves - power and discipline became produced outcomes 
from such changing associations of humans and non-humans, as Callon and Latour (1981) also 
argued.  
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Such questions and concerns seems also to be close to Law’s (1994) suggestions for strategies 
performed in networks of material relations. The author argues that the R&D manger Andrew 
would be profoundly reconfigured if suddenly stripped from all the materials and calculative 
tools; the desk computer, the spreadsheets, the office, allowing him to perform as a manager. In a 
performative perspective, it is not assumed that humans alone produce strategy. It is rather 
suggested here that strategy research should direct close attention towards the possible ways 
strategy are performed through the material relations of technology. As argued by Akrich (1992), 
such concerns also become difficult to attend to from a social constructivist perspective 
assuming that only people can have the status as actors. Notably, also with presumed relevance 
to strategy research, Latour has for a few decades pointed out the explorative and the unexpected 
in relation to technology, and most recently in a special issue on Sociality/Materiality: “ If you 
want to keep you intentions straight, your plans inflexible, your programmes of action rigid, then 
do not pass through any form of technological life. The detour will translate, will betray, your 
most imperious desires.” (Latour, 2002, p.252). 
 
The performative perspective thus keeps the question of strategic technologies open for further 
empirical investigation. There are no assumptions about the ‘strategic ness’ of technologies - the 
possible existence of such entities must be empirically investigated. This can be contrasted to 
ostensive research in which strategic properties are somewhat naively attributed to certain 
technologies at the outset. To take an early example from the world of computer based 
manufacturing “…the primary strategic significance of CAM [Computer Aided Manufacturing] 
lies in the potential for reversing the trend towards more cost-efficient but inflexible productive 
units” (Gerwin, 1982, p.113). “What remains to be done”, to paraphrase a famous saying, is to 
introduce the ‘strategic’ technology into the organization’s design. An intriguing empirical 
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question of existence and becoming is thus transformed into a normative question of how to 
implement the ‘strategic’ entity8. In a performative perspective, the researcher is encouraged to 
abstain from such attributions at one’s own desk and instead retrace the steps – that is, to 
reconstruct the events at hand so as to enter into the process before the act of attribution has 
taken place. This allows the researcher to inquire into the question of how an entity is produced 
so as to become a strategic technology that must be introduced9.   
 
The work associated with a performative perspective adds another organizational dimension to 
the materials making strategy. Callon and Latour (1981), Callon (1991), Latour (1986, 1991), 
Czarniawska-Joerges (1991), Akrich (1992), Law (1994), Czarniawska & Sevon (1996), Joerges 
& Czarniawska (1998), Kreiner & Tryggestad (2002) all argue that technologies can be 
recontextualized in changing associations of humans and non-humans. Czarniawska (2000) has 
quite recently posed the interesting question: “What kind of technology is needed to achieve the 
effect of ‘humanity’?” (p.282). She suggests that organization theorists and social scientists 
interested in identity issues should direct their attention to technology. The humanity of 
contemporary strategy research has made it difficult to address such questions since the identity 
of the strategic actor and subject is assumed to be a ready-made human, that is, an entity with a 
fixed identity and a fixed ontology. The question posed by Czarniawska suggests otherwise, i.e., 
that human actors and identities can be co-produced through interaction with the artifacts of 
technology. Likewise, it is suggested here that strategic technology can be yet another identity, 
                                                          
8 Such acts of ‘strategic’ attribution seems to be quite common in the more management oriented literature. For a more 
extensive review within the field of computer-based manufacturing, see Tryggestad 1995, especially pp.54-96. 
9 Going along with Grant’s (2002) concern regarding strategic research into (un)related diversification, I would like to 
believe that a performative perspective could add some additional insights into this issue too. For example, it is to the 
benefit of diversification research to consider technology as one important dimension discriminating between 
related/unrelated diversification. The performative perspective not only emphasizes the possible significance of 
technology, but also does it in a theoretical distinct way so as to avoid the kind of essentialism associated with 
prevailing attributions and distinctions between what is related or not. 
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co-produced in interaction with humans and non-humans, rather than a given entity to be 
introduced. The difference between the perspectives is summarized below: 
-In the planning- and critical perspectives it is the researcher that defines strategy (and 
reasonable practitioners agree). 
-In the process- and practice perspectives it is practitioners that define strategy (and researchers 
collect their definitions). 
-In the performative perspective, it is humans together with materials and associated artifacts of 
technology that define strategy through practice. 
 
By attending to the association between humans and non-humans, also a possible significant 
explanatory resource has been added to the repertoire of strategy research. To take a classical 
example, the repeated observation of deviations between plan and outcome has been a puzzle 
within strategy research for years. Since the planning perspective has restricted the explanatory 
resources to dematerialized cognitions among humans, it becomes difficult to recognize the 
possible significance of material entities when providing an explanation for cognitions that 
deviate from the plan. Since the process-, practice- and critical perspectives only recognize 
collectives consisting of human actors, it becomes difficult to investigate the possible 
significance of non-human actors when explaining deviating outcomes.  
One claim is that explanations of deviations between plan and outcome can be obtained if the 
association between humans and non-humans is included in the explanatory repertoire.  
A second claim is that the exclusion of the non-human actors can render strategy research 
incapable to account for the production of strategic technologies and associated outcomes. The 
very same exclusion can also render representatives of the critical perspectives inadequately 
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equipped to account for the production of ‘controlling’ or ‘self-disciplining’ human identities as 
well as their boundaries and limitations. 
Finally, the third claim is that the given humanity of contemporary strategy research may not be 
obtained for free. All four perspectives can perhaps participate in producing the kind of costly 
humanity as suggested by Von Clausewitz - by their exclusion of the association between 
humans and non-humans. So these are the three major tasks confronting this author - to provide 
for explanations that substantiate the claims made.  
The aim of this article is thus to qualify the claims outlined above by inquiring into the possible 
significance of materials in the production of strategic outcomes, such as strategic actors, 
technologies, and identities. In order to reach the aim, I have chosen to proceed in different 
ways: In the next section (section 2) I move from the library to the field, reporting from own 
studies of the introduction computer-based manufacturing technology. The claim is furthered 
through an analysis of how various materials performs strategies in practice. As a way of 
concluding (section 3), an attempt is made to sum up some implications for research and 
practice. 
 
2. THE FIELD STUDY - RECONTEXTUALIZING STRATEGY THROUGH PRACTICE 
 
2.1 A short note on methodology 
Written texts are also artifacts, not just the symbolic representation of a reality ‘out there’. They 
are negotiated – materials. The text presented in the subsections that follows is the temporary 
result of such negotiations with actors from the field – that is, a text co-produced in interaction 
with other texts. The notion of ‘inter-textuality’ (Tryggestad, 1995) summarizes this negotiated 
material character of texts. After visiting the humans at the factory site, I sent back a paper 
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transcript from our conversations (each conversation usually lasted between 2-4 hours). When 
safely returned, I discovered that the transcript had not simply passed through their hands, but 
had passed through a process of editing as well. The transcript carried different traces, like the 
stroke of a pencil, sometimes combined with added hand written comments. Comments were on 
different topics, often of a ‘factual’ character, but more important for the present discussion, the 
returned transcripts also carried with them comments with a bearing on the issue of 
representation: “Misunderstandings that do not correspond with reality”10 (as in a 
correspondence theory of truth), “The report does not present an image of our reality as it should 
do” (as in a normative theory of truth). “Sensitive issues that can hurt more than help” (as in a 
pragmatic theory of truth), “Reference to personal engagement” (as in an objectivistic theory of 
truth, now opposing a subjectivistic counter-position from the field it self), “Critique that can be 
misunderstood” (as in a consensus theory of the truth), “We are just about to reconsider our 
security policy” (as in a relational theory of truth – without further access there will be no more 
truths produced).  
 
In one instance, the transcript had not simply passed through the standard edition procedure, in 
which the stroke of the pencil turned out to be the one most frequently in use. In this particular 
case, the editing process seemed more complex and extensive: The whole transcript had, in 
addition to the standard editing with pencil strokes, also gone through major rearrangement using 
a cut-and-paste procedure. The bits and pieces of the original transcript were glued to new blank 
sheets of paper. It must have taken hours to rearrange the text in this way. The effect was a rather 
different account of the introduction of computer-based machinery:  
 
                                                          
10 All quotes are translated from Swedish by the author. The company names are fictious. Emphasis added by this 
author. 
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In the original transcript the actor was quoted as saying: ”We [engineers] know that nobody will 
look back and wonder why there never was built an FMS [Flexible Manufacturing System]. The 
counterproposal was pure frame-up”. In the reconfigured, or better still – recontextualized text, 
this part of the transcript was simply cut out. The original transcript included the following 
passage: “ The floor space for new machines in the NC [Numerically Controlled]-machine shop 
was blocked by other machines put in place by the shop manager”. This passage was slightly 
edited into: “ The floor space for new machines in the NC-machine shop was blocked by other 
machines.”  
So, written texts are negotiated. They are materials that trace associations between humans and 
non-humans, like scissors, glue, blank sheets of paper, not so blank sheets of paper, and 
transform engineers into the readers, the writers and the editors that together with heavy 
machinery and social scientists constitute the world of computer-based manufacturing. From a 
methodological point of view, computer-based machine tools should be treated with the same 
openness than pages from a text: They too can be used in different ways. They too can be 
modified, as if being edited. They too can be capable of tracing networks. They too can take part 
in negotiations – they too can make a difference. Hence, an anthropology of strategy should aim 
at tracing the associations of strategies in the making by reconstructing the chain of related 
events. 
Finally, the author has used the editorial freedom to dramatize the text, i.e., to include those 
cases and events that is interesting and relevant to the task at hand. Three cases are presented in 
the subsections that follow, each of them with a particular bearing on the way materiality 
performs strategy in practice: 
 
2.2 Strategies transforming plans into anti-plans 
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The planning perspective is rather silent when it comes to the issue of anti-plans. In practice, 
anti-plans seem to be an important feature in performing strategies. Anti-plans are not confined 
to cognitive processes located in humans’ brains, nor are they simply a logical deviation from the 
original plan. Anti-plans are more complex than that because they do not only include cognitive 
processes with a deviant logic, but also material entities of diverse kinds. One significant feature 
of anti-plans is that they enlist materials that are deviant from the ones included in the original 
plan. Deviant logics are closely associated with deviant materials. Together they form the body 
politic of anti-plans. So this is also an emerging organizational entity that the process-, practice- 
and critical perspectives have yet to account for. The engineer who did cut-and-paste operation 
was confronted with such an anti-plan when planning for a highly automated factory. This is 
what happened: 
 
In 1986 the engineer was working on his version of a flexible manufacturing system (FMS), at 
Techno Inc., within the department for rationalization studies. The project comprised the 
installation of an FMS consisting of 14 numerically controlled (NC) machines, an automated 
stock room and an automatic tool transport system by robot. The total cost for the project was 
budgeted to 70 million Swedish crowns for phase 1. Full-scale operations were scheduled to 
1994. According to the engineer heading the project, the object was to obtain cost reductions in 
the flow of material. Such an object would be in line with the overall strategy of the corporation, 
to cut down on operating expenses. The project leader hoped for an 80 million Swedish crowns 
(SEK) gain in reduced capital tie-up, and 65 million in lowered production costs. Among other 
things, he counted on being able to rationalize the work force, going from 73 to 23 people at the 
future NC workshop, and rationalizing away the better part of the 110 employees working at the 
Basement workshop. 
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While the project was under development, complete technical specifications were made. The 
machine manufacturers had to make modifications in existing machinery. Among other things, 
tools, palette handling and memory capacity were to be changed. The existing memory capacity 
was of only 200 articles whereas the project leader was of the opinion that Techno's need was of 
over 2000 article numbers. Once phase 1 had been completed, it would be possible to process 
2500 different components of all sizes, all the way up to 2 meters in diameter. The existing 140 
machines at the Basement workshop would, with the help of increased automation, be reduced to 
30 NC-machines and 10 conventional machines, which would then be placed in the NC-
workshop. All new investments would be put into the reorganized NC workshop. In due course 
this would make it possible to shut down the Basement workshop.  
The project management held a meeting at which the leader’s plan was discussed. At the meeting 
the engineer from the rationalization office handed over a written copy of the plan to the 
managing director of the Basement workshop. After the meeting, the latter took the plan with 
him to his workshop and presented it to the machine operators. Later, or as the project leader 
expressed it: “…[when I ]…came down to the shop-floor I was not exactly met with kind 
treatment – I could no longer show my face down there.“ 
Subsequently, two groups with different views on the project were formed and an anti-plan was 
formulated. The manager of the Basement workshop led the group behind it. By now, he had 
turned the machine operators into his allies. Their anti-plan included a central computer system 
to handle communications, and a technical concept allowing the machine supplier to deliver the 
standard machines instead of having to redesign them.  
 
To the project leader’s great disappointment, the machine supplier chose sides in this 
controversy, supporting the anti-plan. The project leader in turn countered the anti-plan by 
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establishing contacts with a Japanese machine manufacturer in 1988 for the purchase and 
integration into an FMS of ten NC machines. This anti-anti-plan was thus of smaller magnitude 
than the original plan and more in line with the anti-plan. It was developed in co-operation with 
the Japanese machine manufacturer’s own experts who took full responsibility for the system to 
work according to specifications.  
The project leader had also altered the wording of his written investment calculus so that the 
number of employees due for rationalization was left unspecified. He did so to “soften the 
emotional reactions… the organization wasn’t quite ready for an FMS“. The project leader had 
also made room in the NC-shop for the new machinery. This room was however occupied by the 
actors behind the anti-plan who one day put three Swedish NC machines there. This last anti-
plan enlisting deviant machines turned out to be too heavy to counteract. It was the end of the 
engineer’s FMS-plans: “This was the greatest disappointment of my life“, was the project 
leader’s commented this result of three years of hard work. And he added: “I only did what I 
judged was in line with the strategy of the corporation – to rationalize operations - that is what 
we are here for!”  
 
Despite the fact that the engineer could make a legitimate claim to have been acting in line with 
the overall strategy, both plans, the original as well as the anti-anti-plan, became marginalized by 
an opposing collective. The anti-plan made the difference: machines turned to be heavier and 
more durable than written project proposals and policy statements. In this case, their weight can 
be not only associated with steel and the forces of gravity. Also the humans engaged in making 
their presence at the shop-floor, the market institution that carries the weight of the company 
supplying the machines, the contracts, the money, and the juridical aspects that go with the 
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market exchange added weight to the anti-plan. Together, the weight of the associations making 
up the action net (Czarniawska, 1997) of the anti-plan turned out to be too heavy to counteract.  
 
In the end, the edited and ‘softened’ project proposals did not make that much of a difference. 
But the first written proposal, i.e., the technicist dream of large-scale automation, made all the 
difference. This was the inscription (Callon 1991, Latour, 1992 Akrich 1992) that later traveled 
around in the workshop, the one that got betrayed – reenacted or recontextualized - by readers 
who acted upon it when mobilizing the anti-plan that carried the day. The engineer-editor 
becomes less quixotic in the performative perspective: this actor knew all too well that paper 
inscriptions can perform in unexpected ways, that they can make a difference in the world of 
computer-based manufacturing. This actor had come to know that the identity of humanity can 
transform during the course of events, from being an object for automation, as given in the 
technicist dream of the original plan, to the anti-plan of an emerging collective consisting of 
acting subjects and deviant materials and logics. Strategy – the body politic- is made of such 
shifting associations that mobilize heterogeneous actors, that transform engineers into editors, 
and plans into anti-plans with deviant materials and logics. 
 
Hence, it is further suggested that strategy is to be considered as an organizational achievement 
in its own right, constructed from diverse materials and humans - and with relations, and indeed 
with possible complex ramifications, for the focal firm: 
Strategy does not exist in the order of things, rather the achieved order of the successful anti-plan 
must be laboriously constructed. Part of this work of constructing the emerging new order 
includes the drawing new fresh boundaries and distinctions between formal/informal and 
inside/outside. More specifically, the question of what firms are is not to be separated and treated 
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independently from this question of what strategy is made of – the two are considered to co-exist 
and co-produce each other, although in variable degrees: In this case, strategy initially emerged 
within the formal boundaries of the firm, only to trespass these very same boundaries as events 
unfolded. The original plan came to represent the formal institutionalized arrangements of the 
focal firm, such as the department for rationalization and the associated strategy, while the  
subsequent emerging anti-plan came to represent the emerging deviation, trespassing these 
boundaries. However, explaining how this boundary between the two is negotiated and settled so 
as to make the day for the emerging collective of the anti-plan, it is not sufficient to look for 
explanations ‘inside’ the firm, nor is it sufficient to stay within the formal boundaries of the firm 
and associated strategies. In order to explain the success of the collective of the anti-plan, it is 
necessary to bypass such formal boundaries and distinctions, in effect extending the network, so 
as to account for the enlisting of deviant machinery and associated suppliers. Failing to attend to 
this trespassing that extended the collective through the enlisting of deviant materials and 
associated suppliers, makes it difficult to account for both the success of anti-plan as well as the 
defeat of the plan.  
 
So, it seems to be a matter of empirical investigation to say something more precise regarding 
how the boundaries (e.g. formal/informal, inside/outside) between strategy and the firm is 
constructed, negotiated and settled in the process, the point being made here that this is a matter 
of degrees, that materials matters in negotiating these degrees, and perhaps of equal importance, 
that degrees may change through the course of events and thus over time. Neither plans, nor 
successful anti-plans exist in the order of things, nor will they endure forever. Hence, strategy is 
considered to be not only a successful organizational accomplishment, it is also an order to be 
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considered as of a temporal kind. This concern with the variable boundaries and temporalities of 
strategy can also be taken further in the next case. 
 
2.3 Strategies transforming non-humans into subjects and humans into objects 
Mangers play the role as humans in the planning perspective. Humans play the role as managers 
in the human centered perspectives. Humans, not machines, play the role as subjects and actors 
with identities in these perspectives. Humans tend to be endowed with the capacity to control 
other humans by their formal position, sheer will and/or cognitive capacity in the planning 
faculty. In practice, human managers do not always control, and if control is exercised, this may 
have less to do with human cognitive capacities and/or management that manages at the human 
interface and more to do with the material associations, such as machine delegates (Latour, 
1992). Hence, the claim made here is that the humans are often transformed into objects of 
control, and their identity is co-produced at the machine interface. 
 
An assembly worker sits in front of a computer-based machine. Together, they sub assemble 
electronic components on a printed circuit board. Red light beams are crisscrossing the hands 
that are interacting with the components to be assembled on the machine table. Suddenly a 
buzzing sound catches the attention of both the visitor and the worker interacting with the 
machine. The human hand retraces the component that is missing from the predetermined 
sequence of assembly. When the missing component is put in place, the buzzing sound 
disappears. Order is reestablished. The order is inscribed into the red light beams: if the hands 
fail to short cut them in an predetermined sequence programmed into the machine, the machine 
will produce a buzzing sound. Order is inscribed into the human body through the human-
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machine interface. It is transformed into a prescription of what constitutes proper human 
behavior when interacting with the machine.  
 
What has been delegated to this machine is not just an order of assembly sequence. The machine 
has also been given the role of the shouting humans called foremen and shop floor management. 
These humans were more fragile, because they needed to eat, sleep and do other things than just 
watching each and every move of the hands on the machine table. The machine never sleeps, 
does not eat and is constantly monitoring, buzzing and beeping each and every time the hands 
are out of order. This machine-management-subject has its own red eyes, its own shouting voice, 
and is transforming human assembly workers into objects of control. Through the machine-
delegate Tayloristic control has reached a level, which will threaten the shop floor managers that 
Fredric W. Taylor tried so hard to please in his writings. The worker says, “It is just a job”. The 
director of the factory says “The strategy we are working along is to be able to do unmanned 
manufacturing – replacing humans by technology and capital! What we are working on is to 
replace what you see here. A total production concept by which perhaps we have a supervisor 
and the rest is machinery. Without the guys, it ticks and turns by itself!” 
 
In the case described above, the supervisor is already in place. The machine delegate performs 
the role of supervisor. However, the director of the factory did recognize that there were costs 
and limitations associated with the strategy of automated control. The humans, at least the guys, 
tended to go elsewhere. They were trained for the job, then they went to other work places to 
practice and that was unfortunate for operations, he explained. So management seems somewhat 
frustrated. Just when strategy at last seems safely confined and in perfect control inside the 
boundaries of the firm - perfect control became undermined through the humans exiting the firm. 
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Indeed, a strategy confined to the boundaries of the firm - in formal control by the human 
manager and self-proclaimed strategist, seems to be an extreme case – and indeed one that is 
very much akin to what strategy research since long has defined and taken for granted as the 
operational or tactical! Albeit, in this case, the strategic ramifications of such taken for granted 
distinctions between what is strategic and what is tactical and operational for the focal firm 
becomes problematic as the strategic ramifications increases as more and more humans exit. 
When there are no longer any humans left in operations, when there is an emerging end to both 
operations and the human-machine interface, formerly operational concerns also has transformed 
into an emerging strategic concern – now advocating the technicist dream of total control 
through reliable automatons (as opposed to the unfaithful humans that had already left). 
 
The assembly worker remaining and interacting with the machine delegate was a colored middle-
aged woman. She did not master the Swedish language so well. Perhaps the inscription of total 
control is a rather local and precarious achievement that goes along with the female colored 
middle-aged human body that does not speak the native language so well. The younger white 
native males (‘guys’) refused this inscription. They went elsewhere. Yes, there seems to be limits 
to the technicist dream of total control through machine delegates. And the humans who exit 
suggest one such limit. When there are no humans left at the interface, when every body has 
gone elsewhere, there is no body left to be inscribed. This marks the end of strategy, including 
the technicist dream of total control. But in this case, strategy still performs through what is 
inscribed into the human body that remains at the interface. There seems to be an uneven 
distribution of human beings in this case: some bodies are more objects, more of a pure mediator 
of the inscription of control, than others.  
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The technicist dream of the director implicitly assumes that the human-machine interface can be 
stabilized; the humans will be the mere ‘supervisors’ of automatic machines. But as the case of 
the machine-management-subject indicates, such roles can be reversed: humans become 
supervised objects at the interface and/or refuses such inscriptions by leaving the interface. In the 
technicist dream of self-appointed human strategists, such unstable technologies and interfaces 
are wished away. In practice, the human identity seems to be less stable than the technicist dream 
assumes.  
 
There are very few limits of strategy in the technicist dream. The material entities of technology 
are not allowed to make a difference. They are just instruments and strategic means to facilitate 
strategic ends as defined by humans. The essentialist conception of strategy assumes likewise, 
that the ‘strategic ness’ and the ‘controlling’ is a given property of the technology – a stable 
attribute of the entity to be introduced. I have suggested above that one limit of strategy is 
defined by the extent to which humans exit or enter the machine interface. The case also 
suggested that humans could be transformed into objects when they enter the interface. But can 
humans not become objects and subjects at the interface? This case does not tell that story – and 
this is also what makes it sound similar to stories told from a critical perspective – in the critical 
perspectives, only controlled human objects are allowed to be produced at the machine interface 
– not at all any free speaking human subjects are allowed to be produced here. However, this 
question should be considered in some more detail if one seeks to qualify the difference that the 
materials of technology can make, and hence, the boundary and limits of strategy and humanity:  
 
There is this other story that should be told at the interface, that of the variable identity of 
technology. What will take place if we allow the humans to interact with such an entity? Will the 
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machine still perform as a management-subject? Will the humans still become objects at the 
interface? Will the boundary and limits of strategy be redefined once more? In short: Will the 
variable identity of technology make a difference? These are important questions. If there can be 
answers to those questions they should be able to further qualify the boundary and limits of 
strategy, including that of the technicist dream of total control of humanity. The claim made here 
is that the variable identity of technology can be the significant instance where the strategy is 
confronted with its own limitations. These limitations may thus be of a different kind than the 
ones that are defined by the humans who exit. Hence, the next story seeks to add to the variable 
identity of humans, a variable identity of non-humans: 
 
2.4 Strategies  transforming  non-humans into a strategic subject and a common object 
Instead of taking the ‘strategic ness’ of technology for granted, a performative perspective 
strongly urges strategy research to provide for explanations of this state of affairs. The question 
of how an artifact becomes a strategic technology is a central one. The task is thus to open the 
black box of ‘strategic’ artifacts so that the process of making them strategic is rendered visible. 
The process of making an artifact into a strategic technology might go like this: 
 
The first step is that of observation. In the late 1960s, through the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
international society of manufacturing observed an entity that was named Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems (‘FMS’). Once it was named, it started to circulate while the observers 
tried to come to terms with what it was. One keen observer was the senior editor of the American 
Machinist “ Buzzword of the half past decade, the term flexible manufacturing system, unknown 
when the concept was invented, seems to be on everybody’s lips. Machine-tool companies have 
organized whole divisions around it, technical societies have organized lengthy seminars about 
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it, the British have launched a magazine for it, and the Japanese have initiated a trade show to 
display it. Yet, if you ask someone who actually owns and operates one to talk about it, you’re 
likely to end up discussing the “line” or the “cell” or even the “machine”. Fact is, nobody’s quite 
precisely sure just what “it” is.” (Jablonowski, American Machinist, 1985, p.125). The Swedish 
engineering scientists also made similar observations regarding ‘FMS’ a few years earlier. They 
were professors in manufacturing and members of a governmental investigation on the 
information technology and society when they made one such observation. “The technology is 
already established in the country and demonstrates a good vitality” (quoted from The 
Governmental Investigation “Computer and Electronics Committee” (CEC in SOU, 1981, p. 51, 
my emphasis). Thus, an entity is first observed and granted an existence as alive, yet it is still 
uncertain what “it is” that is being observed.  “Is it strategic”? , “Is it common”? , or something 
else? 
 
The second step in making an entity into strategic technology is that of generalization. Like most 
other authors on ‘FMS’ at the time, the senior editor in American Machinists argues that ‘FMS’ 
– although still rather undefined, - yet is defined by one essential characteristic, that of being 
strategic through “… the strategic benefits that flexible manufacturing promises…” (Ibid., p.140, 
my emphasis). Through the promises and benefits that is inscribed into it, ‘FMS’ becomes a 
strategic artifact. By now, ‘FMS’ has transformed from being a rather unsettled identity with a 
rather uncertain essence, to become an entity with a far more settled identity, being strategic in 
essence. Hence, through the ostensive definition that now slowly emerges, the ‘FMS’ essences 
also becomes more stable: ‘FMS’ is transformed into being a strategic object, which means that 
in due time it will serve strategic ends. In Sweden, the artifact ‘FMS’ is generalized into a 
national strategic research project and a technology policy for diffusion in order to maintain 
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competitive advantage. The state’s technology policy and the industry are now mobilized by 
CEC in order to introduce the strategic object into the industry under names such as ‘spearhead 
research’ and ‘strategic projects’. The state committed it self two years later by allocating funds 
to a program named ‘The program for flexible manufacturing systems’. The purpose was to 
develop and diffuse ‘FMS’ to industry. One of the engineering scientists in CEC, a professor in 
manufacturing systems, became head of the new strategic program. 
 
The third and final step in making an entity into a strategic technology is that of swapping 
properties with humans, in effect making it into a subject. The strategic object and means is now 
transformed once more, to become a strategic subject that will not settle for common knowledge, 
but demands scientific expertise. “ From a societal-economic view it is of importance that 
external expertise can be utilized…the fast technical development towards larger and more 
complex systems presents such high demands on different kinds of specialized knowledge, 
experience and foresight, that individual companies will face increasing difficulty in maintaining 
sufficient knowledge in order to efficiently develop and apply computer support in their 
production” (Ibid., p. 56, emphasis added).  
 
In 1985, two years after the state had established the ‘FMS’ program, the board members at 
INOX Incorporated were contemplating similar issues: Should they vote for an FMS? Did they 
have the advanced competence that such a system demands? Or should they support one of the 
two other alternatives based on common machinery that they were familiar with?  
In the written investment proposal they had in front of them, the head of manufacturing argued 
that the members of the board should vote for the FMS because it was of “strategic importance”. 
With an FMS, both efficiency and flexibility could be united. With the two other alternatives 
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efficiency could be achieved, but not with the same degree of flexibility in accommodating 
increasing product variety. The computer-based FMS made the difference in the latter respect. 
Besides, the FMS was a fully automated machine, designed to do unmanned manufacturing 
during the whole night. The two other alternatives could not match such high levels of 
automation. Prior to the board meeting, the investment proposal had been scrutinized higher up 
at the corporate level, that is, in the Scientific Advisory Board for Manufacturing. One of the 
engineering scientists in the governmental investigation, the one heading the state funded FMS 
program, was also a member of the Corporate Scientific Advisory Board for Manufacturing. This 
actor now argued for its relevance. The board voted for the FMS alternative. The machinery 
came to the shop floor in January 1987 as one of several ‘strategic projects’ in the FMS program.  
 
Hence, in order to be introduced, the entity must be made into a strategic technology. It is not an 
easy task to make an entity into a strategic technology. The state, the industry, the workers’ 
union, customers and suppliers of machinery must be mobilized and enlisted. The writing and 
publication of governmental reports is only part of the work that had to be put into the effort. The 
senior editor of American Machinist is only telling the first part of the story when mentioning the 
British magazine (not to mention American Machinist), the machine fairs, and the FMS societies 
through out the world. Most OECD member states launched an FMS program as part of their 
technology policy during the early 1980s. OECD was routinely monitoring these programs (e.g. 
OECD, 1989). So, even OECD itself participated in producing the strategic technology FMS.  
 
This entity is also a text that slowly transforms into machinery at the shop floor. It became a text 
in the Governmental Investigation. It became a text in the Corporate Scientific Advisory Board. 
It became yet another text at the company board meeting. It became a spoken text in the 
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discussion at the same meeting. Then it transformed into artifacts made of steel. Texts and 
associated inscriptions, perform strategic technology. They participate in constructing an artifact-
subject that is inscribed into humans and their institutions (‘state’ and the ‘industry’) that act as 
prescribed by the inscription - demanding scientific expertise. The artifact-subject is made of 
texts and documents. These materials and inscriptions is the artifact’s interface. Humans and 
institutions go along with the inscriptions. They are transformed into objects that are no longer 
capable of asking questions regarding the circumstances that produced the text that carried the 
day. This is what strategic technology is made of: an artifact-subject demanding expertise – 
humans and their institutions acting as prescribed by the inscription. In effect, when there are no 
longer any one that can resist – when every body, humans and their institutions, go along with 
the inscription, also the macro-actor (Callon and Latour 1981) of strategic technology is brought 
into existence. 
 
But the task set forth for myself is not yet accomplished. The significance of the variable identity 
of technology has been addressed. It has been argued that humans can be made into objects at the 
interface of the technology-text. The reader could now rightly ask where the limits of strategy 
are. Is there no place left for the human subject and humanity? Of course there is. Through 
practice, at the interface of FMS, a difference between technology-text and technology-steel 
slowly emerges that pave the way to the human subject. I claim that human subjectivity is co-
produced at the interface, in this case, at the interface of machinery made of steel. Without the 
machinery, there would be little place left for the subjectivism usually associated with humans 
and humanity: 
 
 41
The strategic technology further materialized into an FMS consisting of two CNC-machine tools, 
integrated with an industrial robot for loading and unloading of parts, an automatic quality robot 
designed to measure the finished parts, and an over all computer for supervision. Shortly after 
the arrival at the factory, the FMS started to demand different things. The humans at the shop 
floor listened carefully. The FMS was supposed to do unmanned machining during the night by 
drawing upon the scientific expertise that was inscribed into its design. In addition to scientific 
expertise it demanded skilled machine operators, not only at daytime, but also around the clock. 
It became necessary to send the machine operators to the suppliers on specialist courses. Then 
the artifact demanded new programs, a tool measurement machine, an automatic cleaning unit to 
the work pieces, and new tools. An engineer with specialist knowledge of FMS was employed 
during the first year. The FMS engineer introduced new, specially designed tools, adapted to the 
unique design of the machine. The various entities were integrated into the FMS design during 
this first year. There were few good parts coming out of the system, since new demands popped 
up as soon as the first ones had been accommodated into the design. One demand was more 
persistent than others. The artifact kept on demanding automatic tool change although there was 
nothing wrong with the tools. Or as one machine operator explained it: “He [the quality 
measurement robot] believed that the tools were broken”. 
 
Non-humans (automatic cleaning units, new tools, new programs) and humans (machine 
operators, engineers) were added to the machine interface in subsequent steps in order to 
maintain its strategic significance in operations. But even with all these modifications, the lack 
of capacity was still present, and the lack of capacity was of great concern to management. The 
financial director explained that “It is quite simply too slow”. The former production manager 
was of the opinion that it wasn’t the technology as such that failed but the way the rest of the 
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management group looked upon technology. “If I had been at Inox this would have been one of 
the finest investments we could think of because then it would have been taken further in 
development. But in this case, the thinking was different. You have to put your heart into an 
investment... If you are negative towards something you cannot pursue it to 100%.” The 
technical advisor argued “None of this is black or white, but if you see it as a strategic choice of 
direction, I think it was a wrong choice, independently of how the market developed. This is due 
to the fact that the technology does not hold in this kind of situation – there are other solutions to 
parts flexibility and set-up times which turn out cheaper.” 
The FMS cost around 13 million SEK (excluding all additional costs not accounted for in the 
investment proposal). The production manager pushing the investment was given notice in 1989. 
The automatic quality measurement robot was disconnected from the FMS in 1992. That 
improved utilization ratio, but the FMS were still too slow, according to management, engineers 
and machine operators alike. Besides, they were using too much time in order to satisfy the 
FMS's never ending demands for humans and non-humans. The other, more efficient, transfer 
line also needed attention. In 1994, the engineers decided that they would use the FMS as a 
‘laboratory’ for testing of new tools in the other production line. In late summer of 1995, the 
FMS was thrown out. A dedicated computer-based line of machinery took its place, side by side 
with the transfer line that 10 years earlier was scheduled for termination.  
When everything works smoothly, when humans can interact with the artifact without any 
struggle, they tend to take it for granted. In this case, the technology-text of FMS was close to 
such a condition of taken-for-granted ness. But when the artifact becomes recontextualized and 
dressed up in steel, that is, when the variable materials of technology was allowed to make its 
presence, also the interface between humans and non-humans has been altered.  
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To begin with, humans went along with the technology FMS. They struggled to stabilize and 
kept a demanding artifact-subject as a strategic technology. But the struggle did not simply 
reproduce human objects that went along with the texts and the inscriptions making up the 
macro-actor. As the struggle unfolded, it produced something else. This something else – the 
now emerging human subject - was co-produced at the struggling interface. This is the 
significant moment, when humans started to question the ‘strategic-ness’ of the technology. This 
was the destabilizing moment, when they saw that the ‘strategic solution’ became an emerging 
strategic problem. Customer delivery was delayed. There were so many humans and non-humans 
that had been added to comply with the demanding artifact-subject that there was little left to be 
added to the other machines. In this case, the struggling humans chose side:  The FMS may be 
strategic in principle (as in the ostensive definition given to them), but through practice it is the 
old transfer line that becomes strategic – not the FMS. If anything is going to be passed into non-
existence, it is the FMS. And so they did, step by step, recontextualizing and redefining the 
identity of both humans and non-humans once more. Human subjects can question a strategic 
technology, and they can transform a strategic subject into a common object. Human objects 
cannot, because they have to go along with the text and take strategic technology for granted. 
One other artifact, one more interface, must be added if humans are to become subjects again. By 
doing comparative anthropology of technology, i.e. by comparing the transfer line already in 
operation with the FMS, the humans reconnected to the past. Instead of breaking away from the 
past by replacing the transfer line with FMS, they maintained the interface with it. The 
transformation from human object to human subject was facilitated by this connection to the 
past. Also the transformation of a strategic technology to a common object was facilitated by this 
connection to the past.  
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Hence, this last case, on the strategic (macro) actor ‘FMS’, strongly suggests that also the less 
modest distinction between micro and macro in strategy research became profoundly undermined 
through practice. Fragile human institutions like the government, the parliament, and the 
company board were all mobilized and enlisted so as to go along with the demands from the 
emerging strategic subject ‘FMS’. In effect, the ‘social context’ or ‘macro’ it self became 
recontextualized and modified so as to take strategic technology for granted. Yet, this case 
further suggested that such macro-order, once successful achieved, also could be profoundly 
undermined once again – through the struggling interface made of steel.  
 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
 
Returning first to Czarniawska (2000), I would like to suggest a few possible answers to her 
interesting question regarding the kind of technology needed achieve the effect of ‘humanity’: 
Humanity as it were, is not simply given, but seems to be co-produced in variable degrees 
together with heterogeneous materials such as written texts and machinery made of steel: 
 In the first case, on the plans and anti-plans of strategy, it turned out that written plans does 
make a difference. Such materials travel, becomes betrayed and recontextualized into anti-plans. 
By adding the collective of anti-plans to strategic planning, the assumption of a dematerialized 
cognition limited to humans and their procedural rationality will not remain entirely the same. It 
takes more than dematerialized human cognition to complete the transformation into human 
objects of automation. As it turned out, adding a written project proposal to dematerialized 
human cognition did not carry that much weight either. Instead of completing the transformation 
into human objects, a collective consisting of acting human subjects emerged. In this case, the 
production of human subjects seems to require both written plans and proposals with the goal of 
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turning humans into objects, and the successful enlisting of deviant materials and entities such as 
heavy machinery and associated suppliers. 
In the second case it turned out that the interface of the machine-management-subject were the 
significant one in producing a particular kind of humanity. But in contrast to the first case, the 
transformation of humanity into human objects did not simply stop short at the point of a written 
proposal. In the second case, the process of transformation was taken much further – due to an 
extended association consisting of a machine delegate. Hence, the production of a humanity 
consisting of human objects seems to require the presence of a machine-management-subject – 
merely discursive (verbal) management seems not enough. Strategy research can modify the 
assumption of a given humanity in which humans and their discourses are the management 
subject and strategic actor, by including such non-human actors and identities like machine 
delegates.  Doing so will enable strategy research to downplay the search for a given humanity of 
human action and interaction and instead direct more attention to the significance of the material 
interface that produce identities such as human objects and non-human management subjects as 
strategic outcomes. Instead of taking humanity and human identities as a given premises for 
doing strategy research, it is suggested here that a given humanity should be topicalized for 
further investigation: 
In the third case, on the strategic technology FMS, humanity became produced as controlled 
human objects at the interface of technology-text, and as free speaking human subjects at the 
interface of technology-steel. The kind of technology needed to achieve the effect of a humanity 
consisting of free speaking humans involves at least two interfaces, both made of steel: a 
struggling interface (the FMS) as well as a second interface (the transfer line) which allowed for 
comparative anthropology of technology. By doing comparative anthropology of technology, 
humans situated the present in the past. They did not advocate any radical break from history, 
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but reconnected to the past. And perhaps most significant for the present discussion on identities, 
they swapped properties with the non-humans while redefining what they were made of: The 
FMS technology transformed from being undefined, to become the macro-actor consisting of a 
demanding strategic subject, to become a common object. Humanity transformed from controlled 
human objects to reflective human subjects. Knowledge and skills, in the form of reflective 
practitioners, was produced in one and the same process of transformation. The reflective 
practitioners - the human subjects, can thus be explained as an outcome and effect of an 
immensely complex process of transformation situated at the interface of variable identities of 
technology.  
Returning to Von Clausewitz and the complexification the author introduced by suggesting that 
there are costs associated with a given humanity. So, what if any, are the costs associated with a 
given humanity - for research and practice alike? Can a given humanity be obtained for free? 
Beginning with strategy in practice, the modern technicist dream of total control through 
automation, seems to be closely associated with a given humanity, i.e., the human object – an 
entity to be controlled or replaced by an equally given, almost perfected autonomous technology. 
So the question of costs is actually more complex and should be rephrased: What are the costs 
for simultaneously producing these two entities, the human object and the strategic subject of 
autonomous technology? As Callon and Latour (1992) have observed, the history of automation 
is filled with failures, trying to stabilize both at the same time. The perfectly autonomous 
technology has yet to materialize. The cases accounted for in the last section are no exception. 
Even the seemingly hardest case, on the machine-management-subject, suggested a number of 
locally produced limitations to the technicist dream of total control, mediated through the 
presence and absence of the human body. In this case, as in the two others, the human object of 
total control is a precarious achievement – maintained for a while at substantial costs. The 
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technicist dream of autonomous technology, Latour (1996) equals with a crime. It is a crime 
because it excludes technology from the process of organizing and the network of which it forms 
a part - what the main character in this case, the automated train system Aramis, describes as a 
‘vast collectives’ (Ibid.,p.296). By excluding technology, it is no longer allowed to exist in 
variable degrees, but is taken to exist at the outset as a stable entity with a fixed identity e.g., the 
‘strategic’ technology FMS. But in the same moment, even humanity is produced as a given 
entity, e.g., as an object of automation. Neither technology, nor humanity is no longer allowed to 
exist in variable degrees. Thus the second crime follows from the first one, by excluding 
technology from the process of organizing and the collective of which it forms a part; also 
humans are denied access to the resources that produces their variable identities. 
 
The critical perspectives has rushed from the observation of controlled humans to the normative 
conclusion that this state of affairs can be remedied by a radical break - replacing non-human 
interaction with discursive rules and analysis for free speech among the humans. But the cases 
suggests otherwise: if controlled speech can be co-produced at the machine interface made of 
steel – then that is a ground for paying more attention to the significance of materials in the 
production of more or less controlled humans – not at all a ground for making a radical break.   
To become reflective human subjects and thus remake their identities, it requires variable 
materials such as struggling interfaces made of steel. Breaking away from such variable degrees 
of humanity by invoking a given, albeit critical one, do not pave the way for the kind of 
humanity associated with the reflective human subjects, but participates in making the process of 
becoming human subjects invisible. Breaking away from the interface of variable materials will 
in the best of all possible worlds not make any difference at all. Contemporary strategy research 
will then only continue to modernize it-self, attempting at yet another radical break with the past. 
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In a less perfect world, which is a more likely one, strategy research will continue to participate 
in making invisible, to themselves and others, the materials that allows us to become humans in 
variable degrees. As already pointed out by Callon and Latour (1981), the only implication from 
this kind of research will be that the macro-actors will “…purr with relief, for their structure 
disappears from view, whilst they allow their social parts to be sounded.” (p.298). Macro-actors 
are good at producing invisibility too. They are the ones that produce a given humanity, by 
simultaneously attempting at a stabilization of both human and non-human identities. To 
paraphrase Clarke (1992) above, maturity or equilibrium is a condition of the macro-actor, not of 
the technology or the individual human mind. Neither the human mind, nor human skills and 
action, are sufficient to account for the transformation into a macro-actor (and vice-versa). The 
material associations, including their variable identities and ontology must be included in the 
explanation. Knowledge or ‘skill contexts’ are not entirely unaffected by such processes of 
transformation. The humanity as given in contemporary strategic research should not simply be 
treated as an intellectual resource and premises, but should be topicalized as part of what should 
be explained. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
Failing to account for the significance of materials in the production of degrees of humanity in 
the past, have made contemporary strategy research as much producers of strategic outcomes, 
such as strategic actors, technologies and identities as providers of explanations and 
observations. But there is another way to follow than the one of becoming the megaphones of the 
macro-actors. The performative perspective invites both strategic research and practice to 
consider in some more detail how technologies are produced into being both strategic and 
common. By following the actors through their multiple transformations, we can learn more 
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about what made them able to do so. Humans at the interface know that the variable materials of 
technology can make the difference. They are co-produced as such - as knowing human subjects 
- at the interface. Breaking away from the interface is also the breaking away from that particular 
kind of humanity, paving the way for the human object and the associated technicist dream of 
total control. Herein lies the critical paradox of a given humanity. Strategy researchers do not 
exist independently of such processes of transformation, but should be included as part of what 
should be explained. The search for foundations in strategy research has not simply missed the 
given humanity, but partakes in making it into a foundation of strategy research, yet the costs of 
doing so remain outside the frames of contemporary strategy research. The anthropological 
approach that allowed Von Clausewitz to re-search strategy and address the possible significance 
of materials in the production of degrees of humanity is left behind. 
Re-searching strategy in the vein of Von Clausewitz produce other concerns, such as strategy 
research less close attention to the possible significance of materials in producing strategy – what 
the author described as humanity, or what is here put in the more blunt language as the human-
centered assumption. In particular, it has been argued through out this work, that the humanity as 
given in contemporary strategy research is one of those strategic outcomes that warrant further 
explanation. The given humanity is not obtained for free – and instead of becoming modest, 
strategy research seems to participate in reproducing the modern distinction between humanity 
and technology, the associated costs of doing so are summarized here as Technological strategy 
as macro-actor. 
 
What could a modest research agenda look like? With Latour(1994) we could call it ‘non-
modern’, while emphasizing some of its constructive and modest virtues: Rather than striving for 
purity, e.g. by maintaining modern distinctions between humanity and the materials of 
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technology, modest strategy research instead inquire into the process and messy work of 
producing such distinctions and purifications. Further more, modest strategy research, as already 
suggested by Whittington, Pettigrew and Thomas (2002) does not go along with postmodernism 
either. More specifically, I would like to emphasize that modest strategy research does not at all 
go along with the technology fatalism of the post moderns. Instead, modest strategy research 
keep on reminding post moderns like Lyotard about their own peculiar critical paradox: That 
they seem to participate in the reproduction of the techno-science they so clearly denounce. Last 
but not least, modest strategy research does not strive at yet another radical break with the past 
(the ‘after modernism’ sounding too much of the latter), but instead retrace the steps: 
 
Strategic change then, is to be understood, not as a radical break with the past, but as the 
emerging process organizing and producing the collective achievement that temporally has 
become possible to identify as strategy, that is, a coordinated and coherent (or homogeneous) 
entity. Here, the temporality of strategy is important to emphasize.  Such achieved coordination 
and coherence does not exist in the order of things, but must be laboriously constructed and 
maintained. Further more, in such a modest research agenda, also the humans are to be 
considered in a more modest way– neither are they assumed to be the sovereign strategy makers 
by themselves – but nor are they any more left alone to answer to the ‘who’ (the question of 
identity and agency), and ‘how’ (the question of the process producing the outcome), of strategy 
research. For the human practitioners, this also guarantees a far more symmetrical treatment, 
when strategy research attempts to explain and judge strategic success and failures. For example, 
instead of distributing all failures to the humans and no failures to technology (or vice versa), a 
more careful distribution would be allowed for.  
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 A modest task for strategy research then, would be to continue to question these modern taken 
for granted distinctions between humans and technology, micro and macro and so on, by 
explaining how they are constructed and modified through practice. Following the actors (or 
associations) through their practice of constructing and de-constructing strategic (macro) actors, 
seems to be path of inquiry still largely unexplored in strategy research, although – or so it has 
been argued, also the very prospect of making modesty an integral part of the practice of doing 
strategy research, seems to be very much in line with it. 
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